J4 ›› 2014, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (1): 73-77.doi: 10.3976/j.issn.1002-4026.2014.01.013

• Tranfic and Transportation • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Strategy model and solution algorithm of railway passenger ticket price

 LI Shu-Bin1, DANG Wen-Xiu1, FU Bai-Bai2   

  1. 1. Department of Public Security, Shandong Police College, Jinan 250014, China; 2. Institute of Traffic, Shandong Jianzhu University, Jinan 250101, China
  • Received:2013-03-13 Published:2014-02-20 Online:2014-02-20

Abstract:

Competition exists in multiple intercity transportation means. Ticket price is the adjustment lever for the given requirements. This paper presents a bilevel programming model for railway passenger ticket pricing. We initially construct a variational inequality model that can represent multiclass, multipath cost and multicriteria. It serves as the downlevel model of the bilevel programming model. We then establish the uplevel model of the bilevel programming model with total railway income as an object. We also design a chaosmodified projection algorithm based heuristic algorithm to solve a bilevel programming model. Results show that the proposed ticket pricing mechanism is reasonable. It will provide a better theoretical basis for government railway ticket pricing mechanism.

Key words: railway passenger ticket price, bilevel programming, variational inequality, solution algorithm

CLC Number: 

  • U293.1

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