SHANDONG SCIENCE ›› 2017, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (2): 67-77.doi: 10.3976/j.issn.1002-4026.2017.02.011

• Tranfic and Transportation • Previous Articles     Next Articles

The single-step congestion toll model of Y-shaped bottleneck under tactical waiting

ZHANG Meng-ting1, DING Jian-xun1,2, ZHENG-YANG Bian-mu1, LONG Jian-cheng1   

  1. 1.School of Automative and Transportation Engineering, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009, China; 2.Key Laboratory of Process Optimization and Intelligent DecisionMaking Ministry of Education, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009, China
  • Received:2016-12-27 Online:2017-04-20 Published:2017-04-20

Abstract:

In this paper, according to the Y-shaped traffic network containing at least one upstream bottleneck and a common downstream bottleneck, the departure time choice behavior and the optimal road congestion pricing scheme during morning peak hours were investigated under tactical waiting and single step toll. Based on the assumption that the departure time choice followed the user equilibrium (UE) principle, the equilibrium departure rate and individual trip cost under different merging rules were derived. According to the departure time choice behavior, the optimal road congestion charging period and toll level were further derived. Research showed that the proposed pricing scheme could effectively decrease the total congestion of the traffic network system, however, it might lead to the increase in individual trip cost. In addition, it also found that the effectiveness of the proposed pricing scheme not only depended on the merging rules, but also depended on the relative magnitudes of the capacities of the upstream and downstream bottlenecks. Finally, the results showed that there was Braess paradox in the Yshaped traffic network, which meant that the total system travel cost could be increased when the capacity of the upstream bottleneck was increased.

Key words: Y-shaped bottleneck, single-step toll model, tactical waiting, departure time choice, road congestion pricing

CLC Number: 

  • U491